



7 November 2022

BSA COMMENTS ON PRIVACY LEGISLATION AMENDMENT BILL

Submitted Electronically to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs

BSA | The Software Alliance (**BSA**)¹ welcomes the opportunity to provide comments to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (**Committee**) regarding Australia's Privacy Legislation Amendment (Enforcement and Other Measures) Bill (**Bill**)² and the associated Explanatory Memorandum.³

BSA is the leading advocate for the global software industry before governments and in the international marketplace. BSA members create the technology products and services that power other businesses, including cloud storage services, customer relationship management software, human resources management programs, identity management services, security solutions, and collaboration software. Our members have made significant investments in Australia, and we are proud that many Australian entities and consumers continue to rely on our members' products and services to do business and support Australia's economy.

BSA members recognise that businesses must earn their customers' trust and act responsibly with their personal information. BSA has participated in public consultations on privacy-related matters in Australia, such as the *Privacy Legislation Amendment (Enhancing Online Privacy and Other Measures) Bill 2021*⁴ and review of the *Privacy Act 1988 (Privacy Act)*.⁵ As such, BSA takes a significant interest in the amendments put forth in the recent Bill, which seeks to "increase penalties under the Privacy Act, provide the Australian Information Commissioner (**the Commissioner**) with greater enforcement powers, and provide the Commissioner and the Australian Communications and Media Authority (**ACMA**) with greater information sharing powers" (collectively, "**the proposed amendments**").⁶

¹ BSA's members include: Adobe, Alteryx, Altium, Amazon Web Services, Atlassian, Autodesk, Bentley Systems, Box, Cisco, CNC/Mastercam, CrowdStrike, Dassault, Databricks, DocuSign, Dropbox, Graphisoft, IBM, Informatica, Intel, Kyndryl, MathWorks, Microsoft, Nikon, Okta, Oracle, Prokon, PTC, Rockwell, Salesforce, SAP, ServiceNow, Shopify Inc., Siemens Industry Software Inc., Splunk, Trend Micro, Trimble Solutions Corporation, TriNet, Twilio, Unity Technologies, Inc., Workday, Zendesk, and Zoom Video Communications, Inc.

² Privacy Legislation Amendment (Enforcement and Other Measures) Bill, October 2022, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/bills/r6940_first-reps/toc_pdf/22113b01.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf

³ Privacy Legislation Amendment (Enforcement and Other Measures) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, October 2022, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/r6940_ems_715c9651-94ce-4b91-9912-a4023d8c7f61/upload_pdf/22113%20EM.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf

⁴ BSA Comments on the Australian Online Privacy Bill, December 2021, <https://www.bsa.org/policy-filings/australia-bsa-comments-on-australian-online-privacy-bill>

⁵ BSA Comments on Review of Australia Privacy Act 1988, January 2022, <https://www.bsa.org/policy-filings/australia-bsa-comments-on-review-of-australia-privacy-act-1988>

⁶ Explanatory Memorandum (2022), p. 2.

BSA supports Australia's continuous efforts to enhance privacy and address gaps in existing privacy protections. We hope our recommendations below will assist the Committee in its consideration of this Bill.

Summary of BSA's Recommendations

1. Proposed amendments should be considered and passed together with other reforms at the conclusion of the Privacy Act review.
2. Define "serious" and "repeated" interferences to privacy.
3. Clearly state that "adjusted turnover" refers to turnover in Australia.
4. Refrain from amending the extraterritorial application of the Privacy Act.

Proposed amendments should be considered and passed together with other reforms at the conclusion of the Privacy Act review

BSA understands that the proposed amendments are in addition to the comprehensive review of the Privacy Act currently being undertaken by the Attorney-General's Department (**AGD**).

While BSA recognises that, in the wake of the Optus data breach incident, there is a strong impetus for the AGD to quickly enhance and improve the existing privacy legislation to better protect personal data, the urgency with which the proposed amendments were designed and the narrow public consultation window are likely to overlap and duplicate important aspects of this comprehensive review. Enacting the proposed amendments outside of the years-long Privacy Act review also deprives important stakeholders of the opportunity to consider or provide meaningful feedback on the impact of the proposed amendments without the necessary context of the broader reform outcomes. As fundamental issues such as the scope of entities covered by the Privacy Act and the requirements for the secure handling of data are all outstanding issues currently considered for reform in the AGD's 2021 Discussion Paper on the Privacy Act review (**Discussion Paper**),⁷ there is significant uncertainty about the practical impact of the proposed amendments and limited utility in introducing them before implementing the broader privacy reforms.

The opportunity to consider the proposed amendments as part of the broader Privacy Act review is important because, due to the interlinked nature of digital and data issues, legislation or regulations that are intended to address a narrow issue might have implications beyond what was originally contemplated. For example, amending the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Privacy Act, as proposed under the Bill, will have different implications for a company depending on whether the company is an entity that determines how and why to collect personal information from its customers (**controller**) or one that simply processes personal information on behalf of another entity (**processor**).⁸ While the distinction between controllers and processors is not currently reflected in the Privacy Act, the Discussion Paper sought feedback on the benefits and drawbacks of introducing the distinction in the Privacy Act as part of the comprehensive review.⁹ We also note the need to ensure that proposed changes to increase protection against future security incidents and breaches do not

⁷ Discussion Paper, Review of the Privacy Act 1988, October 2021, Chapters 1.4 (Small business exemptions) and 2.19 (Security and destruction of personal information), https://consultations.ag.gov.au/rights-and-protections/privacy-act-review-discussion-paper/user_uploads/privacy-act-review-discussion-paper.pdf

⁸ See "Refrain from amending the extraterritorial application of the Privacy Act" section below for further elaboration.

⁹ Discussion Paper (2021), at Chapter 21 (Controllers and processors of personal information).

overly restrict legitimate secure data uses and data transfers. Such considerations are best taken in totality with the review of the Privacy Act.

Relatedly, other consultations have also noted that taking a reactionary approach to address specific digital, data and cyber security issues may result in “disparate regulations that target specific problems” and create a “piecemeal regulatory environment”.¹⁰ The Privacy Act review seeks to streamline obligations in existing privacy legislation, but amending the legislation in a piecemeal manner may instead lead to a fragmented environment for consumers, increased uncertainty and costs for businesses, and further complications to enforcement efforts.

As such, BSA cautions against implementing the proposed amendments *before* considering the other recommendations under the Privacy Act review. The proposed amendments should be instead passed *together* with the other reforms to the Privacy Act, in connection with the conclusion of the Privacy Act review.

Define “serious” and “repeated” interferences to privacy

Section 13G of the Privacy Act is a civil penalty provision which applies if an Australia Privacy Principles (APP) entity¹¹ engages in an act or practice that is a “serious” or “repeated” interference with privacy. Notably, the Bill will increase the maximum civil penalty under section 13G of the Privacy Act for a body corporate to an amount not more than the greater of the following:

- a) \$50 million;
- b) Three times the value of the benefit obtained, directly or indirectly, and that is reasonably attributable to the conduct constituting the contravention; or
- c) if the court cannot determine the value of that benefit – 30% of the adjusted turnover of the body corporate during the breach turnover period for the contravention.

BSA recognises the importance of imposing “meaningful sanctions” to promote “effective deterrence”.¹² However, the terms “serious” and “repeated” are not defined in the Privacy Act. The Bill also does not provide any details on what would constitute “serious” or “repeated” interferences with privacy. To effectively deter such conduct, it is important for APP entities to have a clear idea of what conduct would fall within the threshold of “serious” or “repeated” interferences with privacy and attract the significantly more severe civil penalty.

In this regard, we recognise that a comprehensive approach to defining these terms is already in consideration in the Privacy Act review. Indeed, one of the recommendations in the Discussion Paper is to “clarify what is a “serious” or “repeated” interference with privacy”.¹³ The Discussion Paper also includes a proposal to clarify these terms in the context of data breaches.

If the proposed amendment to increase the maximum civil penalties in Section 13G of the Privacy Act are considered now, before the comprehensive Privacy Act review addresses these issues, BSA recommends introducing further amendments to Section 13G to define, or

¹⁰ 5 Year Productivity Inquiry: Australia’s Data and Digital Dividend, August 2022, p. 82, <https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/current/productivity/interim2-data-digital/productivity-interim2-data-digital.pdf>.

¹¹ Defined as agencies or organisations subject to the APP, per the Australian Privacy Principles Guidelines, Chapter B: Key Concepts, July 2019, https://www.oaic.gov.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0003/1200/app-guidelines-chapter-b-v1.3.pdf.

¹² Explanatory Memorandum (2022), p. 4.

¹³ Discussion Paper (2021), p. 175-176.

make clear, what would constitute “serious” and “repeated” interferences to privacy, so as to provide better guidance to APP entities in light of the proposed increased penalties.

Clearly state that “adjusted turnover” refers to turnover in Australia

The Bill’s proposed Section 13G(5) sets out what the adjusted turnover of the body corporate will be for the purposes of determining a penalty under Section 13G(3)(c).

However, while the Explanatory Memorandum states clearly that the “adjusted turnover” in Section 13G(3)(c) means “the sum of the value of all the supplies made by the body corporate or related bodies corporate in connection with Australia’s indirect tax zone”,¹⁴ this is not clear from the language of the Bill. The Bill instead relies on an exception – Section 13G(5)(e) – to convey that point.

BSA suggests stating clearly, in the chapeau of Section 13G(5), that “adjusted turnover” refers to the sum of the value of all the supplies made by the body corporate or related bodies corporate in connection with Australia’s indirect tax zone. We have proposed drafting suggestions in red below for consideration:

(5) For the purposes of paragraph (3)(c), the **adjusted turnover** of a body corporate during a period is the sum of the values of all the supplies that the body corporate, and any related body corporate, have made, or are likely to make, during the period **and in connection with Australia’s indirect tax zone**, other than:

- (a) supplies made from any of those bodies corporate to any other of those bodies corporate; or
- (b) supplies that are input taxed; or
- (c) supplies that are not for consideration (and are not taxable supplies under section 72-5 of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999); or
- (d) supplies that are not made in connection with an enterprise that the body corporate carries on. ~~or~~
- ~~(e) supplies that are not connected with the indirect tax zone~~

Refrain from amending the extraterritorial application of the Privacy Act

Section 5B(3) of the Privacy Act currently subjects foreign organisations to the Privacy Act only if they carry on business in Australia (per Section 5B(3)(b)) *and* collect or hold information from a source inside Australia (per Section 5B(3)(c)). However, the Bill proposes to amend the extraterritorial application of the Privacy Act by removing the requirement in Section 5B(3)(c), so as to “ensure foreign organisations that carry on a business in Australia must meet the obligations under the Act, even if they do not collect or hold Australians’ information directly from a source in Australia”.¹⁵

The Explanatory Memorandum states that the proposed amendment is intended to overcome the difficulty of establishing that foreign organisations collect or hold personal information from a source in

¹⁴ Explanatory Memorandum (2022), p. 14.

¹⁵ Explanatory Memorandum (2022), p. 2.

Australia, such as where foreign organisations collect personal information about Australians from a digital platform that does not have servers in Australia and may fall outside of the Privacy Act.¹⁶ **However, BSA urges caution in implementing the proposed amendment to the extraterritorial application of the Privacy Act, which could be read to cover any business operating in Australia regardless of whether that business processes data related to Australians.**

The sweeping nature of this amendment may lead to significant unintended consequences, including conflicts with other privacy and data protection laws already applied to global businesses operating in Australia. We urge careful consideration of this proposal. **As one example of a potentially unintended consequence, the proposed amendment could be read to apply the Privacy Act differently to companies depending on whether they are processing data on behalf of other companies (as a processor) or processing data for their own purposes (as a controller).**¹⁷ The proposed amendment could inadvertently sweep in a broad range of processors that act on behalf of other companies, which may not have been the intent.

As a consequence of their business models, processors often have limited access to the personal information collected by their customers. In many cases, a processor's access to and knowledge of personal information collected by its customers are limited by the privacy and security controls built into its product and enforced by contractual terms between the processor and its customers.¹⁸ The proposed amendment could be read to treat processors as subject to the Privacy Act so long as they are conducting business in Australia, even though they may not be processing any personal data related to Australians. For example, a global cloud storage company may conduct business in Australia – but only some of its business customers will collect data relating to Australians, and only some of the data it handles will be processed in Australia. By removing Section 5B(3)(c), the Privacy Act's jurisdiction may sweep much more broadly to cover foreign enterprise service providers in such situations.

In light of the above, BSA strongly recommends refraining from amending the extraterritorial application of the Privacy Act at this point in time. The extraterritorial application of the Privacy Act should be informed by discussions on whether to implement the controller-processor distinction in the Privacy Act review.

However, to the extent that the Committee agrees with the proposed amendment to the extraterritorial application of the Privacy Act, we urge the Committee to recommend that: a) the Bill list out indicators for determining if an entity is “carrying on business in Australia” in the Privacy Act; and b) the requirement for information to have been collected or held in Australia to be listed as one of the indicators of “carrying on business in Australia”.¹⁹ This would provide foreign businesses with more certainty as to whether they fall within the scope of the Privacy Act.

Conclusion

We thank the Committee for the opportunity to provide recommendations to the Bill and appreciate

¹⁶ Explanatory Memorandum, p. 13.

¹⁷ The Privacy Act does not currently distinguish between controllers and processors. However, the controller-processor distinction is necessary in today's digital economy, where an individual may use a service from one consumer-facing entity, but that consumer-facing entity may rely on numerous other enterprise service providers to store, analyse, and process the data in connection with that service.

¹⁸ “Controllers and Processors: A Longstanding Distinction in Privacy”, October 2022, <https://www.bsa.org/files/policy-filings/10122022controllerprodinction.pdf> and enclosed to this submission.

¹⁹ This was also suggested in the Discussion Paper. See Discussion Paper (2021), p. 159.

the Committee's consideration of our comments above. Please do not hesitate to contact BSA if you have any questions regarding this submission or if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Tham Shen Hong

Tham Shen Hong
Manager, Policy – APAC
shenhongt@bsa.org
+65 91719408



Controllers and Processors: A Longstanding Distinction in Privacy

Modern privacy laws have coalesced around core principles that underpin early privacy frameworks. For example, leading data protection laws globally incorporate principles of notice, access, and correction. They also identify appropriate obligations for organizations in fulfilling these rights, making important distinctions between companies that decide how and why to process personal data, which act as controllers of that data, and companies that process the data on behalf of others, which act as processors of such data. Privacy and data protection laws worldwide also assign different obligations to these different types of entities, reflecting their different roles in handling consumers' personal data.

The concepts of controllers and processors have existed for more than forty years. These roles are key parts of global privacy and data protection frameworks including the OECD Privacy Guidelines, Convention 108, the APEC Privacy Framework, and ISO 27701.

The History of Controllers and Processors

1980: OECD PRIVACY GUIDELINES

The OECD Privacy Guidelines launched the modern wave of privacy laws, building on earlier efforts including a 1973 report by the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare that examined privacy challenges posed by computerized data processing and recommended a set of fair information practice principles.¹

The OECD Guidelines, adopted in 1980, define a "**data controller**" as the entity "competent to decide about the contents and use of personal data regardless of whether or not such data are collected, stored, processed or disseminated by that party or by an agent on its behalf."²

Comments to the 1980 Guidelines recognize "[t]he term 'data controller' is of vital importance" because it defines the entity "legally competent to decide about the contents and use of data."³

1981: COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION 108

The Council of Europe in 1981 opened for signature the first legally binding international instrument in the data protection field. Convention 108 defined a "**controller of the file**" as the person "competent . . . to decide" the purpose of automated files, as well as "which categories of personal data should be stored and which operations should be applied to them."⁴

1995: EU DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE

The 1995 EU Data Protection Directive, which previously formed the basis of privacy laws in EU member countries, separately defined both controllers and processors.⁵ **Controllers** were defined as the natural or legal person that "determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data," while **processors** were defined as a natural or legal person "which processes personal data on behalf of the controller."

2005: APEC PRIVACY FRAMEWORK

The APEC Privacy Framework builds on the OECD Privacy Guidelines and provides guidance on protecting privacy, security, and the flow of data for economies in the APEC region. It was endorsed by APEC in 2005 and updated in 2015. The Framework defines a **controller** as an organization that “controls the collection, holding, processing, use, disclosure, or transfer of personal information,” including those instructing others to handle data on their behalf. It does not apply to entities processing data as instructed by another organization.⁶

2011: APEC CROSS-BORDER PRIVACY RULES (CBPR) SYSTEM

All 21 APEC economies endorsed the Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) System in 2011, creating a government-backed voluntary system designed to implement the APEC Privacy Framework.⁷ The CBPR system is limited to **data controllers**. In 2015, APEC created a separate Privacy Recognition for Processors (“PRP”) System to help controllers identify qualified and accountable **processors**.⁸

2016: EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION

The EU General Data Protection Regulation replaced the 1995 Directive, maintaining the definition of **controller** as the entity that “determines the purposes and means” of processing personal data, and the definition of **processor** as the entity that “processes personal data on behalf of the controller.”⁹ It was adopted in 2016 and took effect in 2018.

2018: COUNCIL OF EUROPE MODERNIZED CONVENTION 108

Convention 108 was modernized in 2018, revising the definition of **controller** and adding a definition of processor. A controller is the entity with “decision-making power with respect to data processing.”¹⁰ A **processor** “processes personal data on behalf of the controller.”¹¹

2019: ISO 27701

The International Organization for Standardization published ISO 27701 in 2019, creating the first international standard for privacy information management. ISO 27701 allocates obligations to implement privacy controls based on whether organizations are controllers or processors. It recognizes that a **controller** determines “the purposes and means of processing”¹² while **processors** should ensure that personal data processed on behalf of a customer is “only processed for the purposes expressed in the documented instructions of the customer.”¹³

2023: US STATE PRIVACY LAWS




In the United States, five new state consumer privacy laws will take effect in 2023, in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Utah, and Virginia. All five laws distinguish between **controllers** or businesses that determine the purpose and means of processing, and **processors** or service providers that handle personal information on behalf of the controller or business.






According to a March 2021 report, **more than 84%** of countries responding to an OECD questionnaire define “data controller” in their privacy legislation.¹⁴

Controllers and Processors: A Distinction Adopted Around the World

Privacy laws worldwide draw from longstanding privacy frameworks, recognizing the distinction between controllers and processors and assigning different responsibilities to these different entities based on their different roles in processing personal data. The chart below identifies some of the countries with national privacy or data protection laws that reflect the roles of controllers and processors.

 JURISDICTION	 CONTROLLER	 PROCESSOR
Brazil ¹⁵	Controller: A “natural person or legal entity . . . in charge of making the decisions regarding the processing of personal data.”	Processor: A “natural person or legal entity . . . that processes personal data in the name of the controller.”
Cayman Islands ¹⁶	Data Controller: A “person who, alone or jointly with others <i>determines the purposes, conditions and manner</i> in which any personal data are, or are to be, processed”	Data Processor: Any person “who processes personal data <i>on behalf of</i> a data controller but, for the avoidance of doubt, does not include an employee of the data controller.”
European Union ¹⁷	Controller: A natural or legal person that “alone, or jointly with others, <i>determines the purposes and means of processing</i> personal data”	Processor: A natural or legal person that “processes personal data <i>on behalf of</i> the controller.”
Faroe Islands ¹⁸	Controller: A natural or legal person that “alone or jointly with others, <i>determines the purposes and means of the processing of</i> personal data.”	Processor: A natural or legal person that “processes personal data <i>on behalf of</i> the controller.”
Hong Kong ¹⁹	Data User: A person who “either alone or jointly or in common with other persons, <i>controls the collection, holding, processing or use of the data.</i> ”	Data Processor: A “person who: (a) Processes personal data <i>on behalf of</i> another person; and (b) <i>Does not process the data for any of the person’s own purposes.</i> ”
Kosovo ²⁰	Data Controller: A natural or legal person that “alone or jointly with others, <i>determines purposes and means of personal data processing.</i> ”	Data Processor: A natural or legal person that “processes personal data for and <i>on behalf of</i> the data controller.”
Malaysia ²¹	Data User: A person “who either alone or jointly or in common with other persons processes any personal data or <i>has control over or authorizes</i> the processing of any personal data, but <i>does not include a data processor.</i> ”	Data Processor: A person “who processes the personal data solely <i>on behalf of</i> the data user, and <i>does not process the personal data for any of his own purposes.</i> ”
Mexico ²²	Data Controller: An individual or private legal entity “ <i>that decides on the processing of</i> personal data.”	Data Processor: The individual or legal entity that “alone or jointly with others, processes personal data <i>on behalf of</i> the data controller.”
Philippines ²³	Personal Information Controller: A person or organization “ <i>who controls the collection, holding, processing or use of personal information, including a person or organization who instructs another person or organization to collect, hold, process, use, transfer or disclose personal information on his or her behalf. The term excludes a person or organization who performs such functions as instructed by another person or organization.</i> ”	Personal Information Processor: A natural or juridical person “to whom a personal information controller may <i>outsource</i> the processing of personal data pertaining to a data subject.”
Qatar ²⁴	Controller: A natural or legal person “who, whether acting individually or jointly with others, <i>determines how Personal Data may be processed and determines the purpose(s) of any such processing.</i>”	Processor: A natural or legal person “who processes Personal Data for the Controller.”
Singapore ²⁵	Organisation: Any individual, company, association or body of persons, corporate or unincorporated, whether or not: (a) formed or recognized under the law of Singapore or (b) resident, or having an office or a place of business, in Singapore.	Data Intermediary: An organisation “which processes personal data <i>on behalf of another organisation</i> but does not include an employee of that other organisation.”

 JURISDICTION	 CONTROLLER	 PROCESSOR
South Africa ²⁶	Responsible Party: A public or private body or any other person that “alone or in conjunction with others, determines the purpose of and means for processing personal information.”	Operator: A person who “processes personal information for a responsible party in terms of a contract or mandate, without coming under direct authority of that party.”
Thailand ²⁷	Data Controller: A person or juristic person “having the power and duties to make decisions regarding the collection, use, or disclosure of the Personal Data.”	Data Processor: A person or juristic person who “operates in relation to the collection, use, or disclosure of Personal Data pursuant to the orders given by or on behalf of the Data Controller.”
Turkey ²⁸	Data Controller: A natural or legal person “who determines the purposes and means of processing personal data.”	Data Processor: A natural or legal person “who processes personal data on behalf of the data controller upon its authorization.”
Ukraine ²⁹	Personal Data Owner: A natural or legal person who “determines the purpose of personal data processing, the composition of this data and the procedures for its processing.”	Personal Data Manager: A natural or legal person who is “granted the right by the personal data owner or by law to process this data on behalf of the owner.”
United Kingdom ³⁰	Controller: A natural or legal person that “alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.”	Processor: A natural or legal person that “processes personal data on behalf of the controller.”

Endnotes

- ¹ Dept. of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens (1973), <https://aspe.hhs.gov/reports/records-computers-rights-citizens>.
- ² OECD, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, § 1(a) (1980), <https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm>.
- ³ *Id.* at Explanatory Memorandum, § IIB, para. 40.
- ⁴ Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, art. 2(d), Jan. 28, 1981, ETS No. 108, <https://rm.coe.int/1680078b37>.
- ⁵ Directive 95/46/EC, art. 2(d)-(e), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX%3A31995L0046%3AEN%3AHTML>.
- ⁶ APEC, APEC Privacy Framework (2015), § II.10, <https://cbprs.blob.core.windows.net/files/2015%20APEC%20Privacy%20Framework.pdf>.
- ⁷ See APEC, 2011 Leaders’ Declaration, https://www.apec.org/meeting-papers/leaders-declarations/2011/2011_aelm; <http://cbprs.org/privacy-in-apec-region/>.
- ⁸ See APEC Privacy Recognition for Processors (“PRP”) Purpose and Background, <https://cbprs.blob.core.windows.net/files/PRP%20-%20Purpose%20and%20Background.pdf>.
- ⁹ EU General Data Protection Regulation, art. 4(7)-(8), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=EN>.
- ¹⁰ Council of Europe, Modernised Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, art. 2(d), May 17-18, 2018, ETS No. 108, https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?objectId=09000016807c65bf.
- ¹¹ *Id.* at art. 2(f).
- ¹² Int’l Org. for Standardization, International Standard ISO/IEC 27701 Security Techniques—Extension to ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 for Privacy Information Management—Requirements and Guidelines 1, 4-5, 29-55 (2019).
- ¹³ *Id.* at 43.
- ¹⁴ OECD, Report on the Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 16 (2021), <https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/privacy.htm>.
- ¹⁵ Law No. 13,709, Aug. 14, 2018, art. 5 VI-VII (as amended by Law No. 13,853, July 8, 2019, Official Journal of the Union [D.O.U.] July 9, 2019), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Brazilian_General_Data_Protection_Law.pdf.
- ¹⁶ Data Protection Act (2021), § 2, https://ombudsman.ky/images/pdf/laws_regs/Data_Protection_Act_2021_Rev.pdf.
- ¹⁷ EU General Data Protection Regulation, art. 4, 2016 O.J. (L 119), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3A%3A2016%3A119%3ATOC>.
- ¹⁸ Act on the Protection of Personal Data No. 80 (2020), §§ 6(6)-(7), <https://dat.cdn.f0/media/opcxh1q/act-on-the-protection-of-personal-data-data-protection-act-act-no-80-on-the-7-june-2020.pdf?s=LA6lqXBchs1Ryn1Kp9h3KSPuFog>.
- ¹⁹ Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, (1996) Cap. 486, § 2(1), <https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap486>. See https://www.pcpd.org.hk/english/data_privacy_law/ordinance_at_a_Glance/ordinance.html.
- ²⁰ Law No. 06/L-082 on Protection of Personal Data (2019), art. 3, §§ 1.11, 1.14, https://www.dataguidance.com/sites/default/files/law_no_06_l-082_on_protection_of_personal_data_0.pdf.
- ²¹ Act 709 Personal Data Protection Act 2010, § 4, <https://ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/89542/102901/F1991107148/MYS89542%202016.pdf>.
- ²² Federal Law on Protection of Personal Data Held by Private Parties, art. 3, XIV & IX, Official Gazette July 5, 2010, <https://www.dataguidance.com/legal-research/federal-law-protection-personal-data-held>.
- ²³ Data Privacy Act of 2012, Rep. Act No. 10173, §§ 3(h)-(i) (Aug. 15, 2012), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2012/08/15/republic-act-no-10173/#:~:text=11.,transparency%2C%20legitimate%20purpose%20and%20proportionality>.
- ²⁴ Law No. 13 of 2016 Personal Data Privacy Protection, art. 1, https://www.dataguidance.com/sites/default/files/law_no_13_of_2016_on_protecting_personal_data_privacy_-_english.pdf.
- ²⁵ Personal Data Protection Act 2012, as amended, § 2(1), <https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/PDPA2012>.
- ²⁶ Protection of Personal Information Act, 2013, Act 4 of 2013, Chap. 1, <https://popia.co.za/>.
- ²⁷ Personal Data Protection Act, B.E. 2562 (2019), § 6, <https://cyrilla.org/es/entity/si9175g71u?page=1>.
- ²⁸ Law on Protection of Personal Data No. 6698 (2016), art. 3(g), 3(i), <https://www.kvkk.gov.tr/icerik/6649/Personal-Data-Protection-Law>.
- ²⁹ Law of Ukraine on Personal Data Protection (2010) (as amended), art. 2, 4(4), <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/2297-17#Text>.
- ³⁰ UK General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (as amended), c. 1, art. 4(7)-(8), <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2016/679>. See also UK Information Commissioner’s Office, Who Does the UK GDPR Apply To?, <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/key-definitions/>.